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Summary
Group-living animals routinely have to reach a consensus
decision and choose between mutually exclusive actions
in order to coordinate their activities and benefit from social-
ity [1, 2]. Theoretical models predict ‘‘democratic’’ rather
than ‘‘despotic’’ decisions to be widespread in social verte-
brates, because they result in lower ‘‘consensus costs’’—
the costs of an individual foregoing its optimal action to
comply with the decision—for the group as a whole [1, 3].
Yet, quantification of consensus costs is entirely lacking,
and empirical observations provide strong support for the
occurrence of both democratic and despotic decisions in
nature [1, 4, 5]. We conducted a foraging experiment on a
wild social primate (chacma baboons, Papio ursinus) in
order to gain new insights into despotic group decisionmak-
ing. The results show that group foraging decisions were
consistently led by the individual who acquired the greatest
benefits from those decisions, namely the dominant male.
Subordinate group members followed the leader despite
considerable consensus costs. Follower behavior wasmedi-
ated by social ties to the leader, and where these ties were
weaker, group fission was more likely to occur. Our findings
highlight the importance of leader incentives and social
relationships in group decision-making processes and the
emergence of despotism.
Results and Discussion
The way in which group-living animals coordinate their actions
is fundamental to our understanding of the evolutionary and
ecological basis of sociality. The benefits of group living are
largely reliant on animals remaining cohesive, which often
requires consensus choices from mutually exclusive actions
[3]. Thus far, empirical work on consensus decision making
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insect swarms [7], fish schools [8], and bird flocks [9], in which
collective behavior can emerge from simple rules of self-orga-
nization [10, 11]. Much less is known about the mechanisms
underlying decision making in socially complex and heteroge-
neous groups, in which individuals are often related and have
long-term social relationships with one another [2] (e.g., social
birds, carnivores, and primates). In these groups, individual
group members often differ with respect to optimal activity
budgets [12], levels of information [13], and ability to monopo-
lize resources [14]. Such differences lead to conflicts of inter-
est that can impede the achievement of consensus decision
making [15]. In the face of such conflict, two different modes
of decision making might be adopted. First, consensus deci-
sions can be reached democratically, whereby all group mem-
bers contribute to the decision, independent of their individual
identities or social status. At the other extreme, a decision can
be despotic, taken by a single animal (‘‘leader’’) with other
members (‘‘followers’’) abiding by this decision [2]. Theoretical
models predict the former to be most common in nature [1, 3],
and this is supported by a number of empirical examples [2].
However, despotic decisions are also widespread among
group-living vertebrates [4], including humans [16]. The profu-
sion of despotic decision making in nature therefore presents
a significant challenge to our understanding of sociality.
There are conceivably several different types of animals that
might emerge as a leader. In group movements, for instance,
the individuals with the greatest incentives [17] or the most per-
tinent information [18] often lead groups, and are normally—
but not always [19]—at the front of group progressions. Yet,
the incentives or information required to create leaders does
not necessarily generate following, and both processes are
necessary for a despotic decision. New insights into group de-
cision making may therefore be acquired by an understanding
of not only what incentives may be necessary for leaders to
emerge but also why followers accept a leader’s decisions,
especially when this compromises their own activity [2]. In
the latter case, one possibility is that long-term benefits derived
from social or genetic ties with the leader outweigh the short-
term costs associated with accepting the leader’s current
decision. This explanation is supported by recent research
indicating that follower roles may be primarily associated
with stable vertebrate social systems [20, 21] in which kin sup-
port one another during conflicts [22] and the cultivation and
exploitation of social relationships with those who are not kin
can also enhance fitness [23]. In this study, we ask (1) whether
the acquisition of foraging benefits by a minority of individuals
creates incentives for them to lead; (2) whether group-mates
are willing to follow leaders despite large consensus costs;
and (3) whether such follower behavior is mediated by social
and/or genetic ties to the leader.
We used an experimental approach in wild chacma baboons
to estimate the benefits to leaders and costs to followers for
democratic and despotic decisions. Baboon groups are an
ideal model system in which to explore such questions. Previ-
ous observations of baboon movement patterns suggest that
their group decisions may be largely democratic in nature but
also have the potential for active leadership by both male and
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plex social system with a linear dominance hierarchy and are
heterogeneous in composition. The dominance hierarchy
also results in large asymmetries in resource-holding potential
[14] and, thus, potentially high consensus costs from despotic
foraging decisions in which dominant animals have incentives
to lead. Furthermore, genetic and social ties among group
members can influence individual behavior [22], providing
fitness benefits [23].
Democratic or Despotic Group Decisions?
Two wild-baboon groups (one large, one small) were presented
with an experimental food patch within their home range. This
patch was of a size and shape predicted to create highly
skewed foraging benefits among group members, relative to
naturally occurring food resources. Thus, patches were
expected to create consistent incentives for a minority of dom-
inant individuals to lead and to result in consensus costs for the
majority of followers. We therefore interpreted visits to experi-
mental food patches as being the result of despotic decisions
and visits to natural food patches as the result of democratic
decisions.
We found that both baboon groups consistently visited the
experimental food patch in preference to natural patches (Fig-
ure 1), indicating that despotic group decisions were the norm.
The pattern of patch visits suggested that these decisions
were made intentionally rather than opportunistically: at sun-
rise, the groups usually traveled directly from their sleeping
sites to the patch (median travel time: 58 min). Groups then
spent a large proportion of their normal foraging time at the
patch location or, for those individuals who rarely entered
the patch, at its periphery (mean 6 SE: 83 6 5 min). This is
comparable to >30% of the baboons’ normal daily foraging
time. The groups normally visited the location just once on
any given day during the experimental period (median visits/
day = 1) and left the patch only after it was completely empty.
Additionally, examination of group daily travel routes showed
that the groups passed through the experimental food patch
locations significantly more often when food was present
(c21 = 6.13, p = 0.01; Figure S1, available online).
Figure 1. Group-Decision Outcomes
Two baboon groups (large, small) were presented with the opportunity to
visit experimental food patches. These patches were designed to create
benefits for a minority of individuals but costs for the majority. Group deci-
sions that resulted in patch visits are shown in black, whereas nonvisits are
shown in gray. Group fissions, in which groups did not reach a consensus
but rather split, are shown in white.Leader Incentives and Follower Costs
During our experiments, we also varied the degree to which the
experimental food patches could be monopolized. Patches
were provided in two treatments: ‘‘low’’- and ‘‘high’’-contest
competition. The low-contest treatment presented the same
amount of food as the high-contest treatment but over twice
the area. This design allowed us to investigate patterns of
despotism in relation to different configurations of benefits
to leaders and consensus costs to followers. The leader was
defined as the animal that arrived first at the patch [21, 27],
with others defined as followers.
In both treatment types, the dominant male was usually the
first to arrive at the food patch (Figure 2). Dominant males,
therefore, acted as leaders more frequently than expected
by chance (Binomial tests: p < 0.001 for each group). Dominant
males also tended to obtain more food in the high-contest
patches than in the low-contest patches (Figure 2). Neverthe-
less, the incentives for leaders in the low-contest treatment
were still sufficiently high to result in despotic decisions. Later
arrivals at the patch acquired progressively less food in both
treatments (Figure 2). We also found that the influence of social
rank on arrival extended beyond the leader, producing a linear
Figure 2. Leader Incentives and Identity
The mean 6 SE foraging benefit attained in experimental patches, as a
function of mean 6 SE arrival order, for the large group (A) and the small
group (B). Data for high-contest- and low-contest-competition treatments
are shown in squares and triangles, respectively, and standard errors are
depicted by dotted lines. The dominant male (filled symbols) usually arrived
first and gained the highest foraging benefits, except in the large group
during low-contest conditions, when his attempts to monopolize a larger
area and chase off competitors resulted in a reduced intake rate. Indeed,
the dominant male tended to acquire the highest foraging benefits in the
high-contest-competition treatment, when food was more easily monopo-
lized (t tests between treatments: Tlarge = 22.25, df = 30, p = 0.04; Tsmall =
21.91, df = 25, p = 0.098).
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search has indicated that under natural foraging conditions,
leadership may be more evenly distributed across the group
[28], a pattern also observed in this population (Figure S2),
suggesting that the active leadership by the dominant male
reported here was linked to his foraging benefits.
We then estimated the individual costs and gains of
despotic decisions as the difference in consumption between
natural and experimental conditions. Our analyses revealed
that a minority of group members visiting the experimental
patch obtained consensus gains, but the majority experienced
substantial consensus costs (Figure 4). Moreover, these costs
were more strongly skewed under conditions of high-contest
competition than low-contest competition: the binomial
skew index B [28] increased by 27%–76% between treatments
in the large and small groups, respectively (Figure 4).
These findings indicate that a majority of subordinate
individuals will accept despotic decisions, even where this
compromises their own activity. This result is consistent for
decision outcomes that differ in costs and for groups of differ-
ent size and is coherent with high-ranking individuals having
a particularly strong influence on the behavior of other group
members [29, 30]. This influence was sufficiently strong to
generate follower behavior in the absence of ‘‘herding’’ or
any other forms of coercive behavior [31, 32].
Why Accept Despotism?
This leaves an important outstanding question: given that
many followers experienced high consensus costs of following
dominant-led group decisions, why follow? To answer this, we
explored whether despotic group behavior could be explained
by genetic and/or social ties to leaders (dominant males). We
found that individuals with stronger social affiliation to the
leader followed more closely. However, this was not a linear
effect, since some individuals were close followers despite
low affiliation (Figure 3B). These individuals were adult males
who arrived closely behind the leader by virtue of their domi-
nance rank rather than their social relationship. We found no
effect of an individual’s genetic relationship to the leader on
follower behavior (Table S1). We also tested for a more com-
plex ‘‘chain’’ effect, in which an individual’s follower behavior
is determined by the social or genetic relationship to the
animal directly ahead of it rather than to the leader. Thus, we
compared the strength of social affiliation and genetic related-
ness between sequential pairs (dyads) in the arrival order with
that of an average pair in the group. We found no differencesFigure 3. The Role of Dominance Rank and Social Affiliation
(A) High-ranked animals arrived earlier at experimental food patches
than subordinates (GLMMs: small group, c21 = 32.9, p < 0.001; large
group, c21 = 2.9, p < 0.001).
(B) The effect of an individual’s social affiliation to the leader on that in-
dividual’s arrival order (GLMMs: small group, c21 = 37.4, p < 0.001; large
group, c21 = 33.8, p < 0.001).
The lines shown are the predicted effects from GLMMs controlling for all
other significant effects and for repeated observations of individuals
across days. See Table S1 for the full model results.
for social affiliation (Wilcoxon tests across all trials: Wlarge =
2967, n = 527, p = 0.68; Wsmall = 1721, n = 226, p = 0.99) or for
genetic relatedness in the large group (W = 3860, n = 527,
p = 0.10), whereas relatedness was lower than average in
the small group (W = 1381, n = 226, p = 0.04).
These findings suggest that close-follower behavior is more
likely when social relationships between leaders and followers
are strong. Therefore, we suggest that the long-term benefits
derived from social ties with the leader may outweigh the
short-term costs associated with accepting the leader’s
current decision. Close association with these individuals
may provide females and their dependent offspring with direct
fitness benefits, such as increased infant survival [33] and pro-
tection from predators [34]. Taken together with the preceding
results, follower behavior appears to emerge as a combination
of social rank and affiliation to the leader. In the first case, high-
ranking animals most likely follow out of an interest in acquir-
ing a share of the food in the patch (Figure 2), whereas in the
second case, lower-ranked animals appear to follow primarily
as a consequence of social affiliation (Figure 3B). The absence
of a kinship effect on follower behavior might appear puzzling.
However, in this case, the leader was most often the dominant
male, who is an immigrant into the group and thus unrelated to
other group members.
Group Fissions and Consensus Nonvisits
Occasionally, the groups did not collectively visit the experi-
mental patch. Rather, the groups either fissioned into two
subgroups of which only one visited the patch (n = 6/80) or re-
mained cohesive but failed to visit the patch entirely (n = 14/80)
(Figure 1). In both cases, there was no clear temporal pattern to
suggest that subordinates were learning to resist costly des-
potic decisions (Figure S3), nor was there any spatial pattern
suggesting that group members were less inclined to visit on
those days when travel costs were higher (t tests comparing
distances between sleeping site and patch when nR 6 cases:
fission, tlarge = 1.03, df = 5, p = 0.35; nonvisits, tsmall = 0.73, df =
13, p = 0.48). Therefore, we must seek alternative explanations
for group fission and nonvisits.
Fission events occurred in accordance with the foraging
benefits derived from the experimental patches, i.e., the minor-
ity subgroup was comparable in size to the number of animals
acquiring a net consensus gain (Figure S4). Given the impor-
tance of social relationships in mediating follower behavior, we
predicted that the distribution of fission events, which were
only observed in the large group (Figure S3), reflected variation
between the two groups in the strength of social relationships
connecting the leader and other group members. To test this
prediction, we compared the daily time spent in social activity
(grooming) in the two groups, together with the size of the
leader’s social networks (i.e., grooming-clique size [35]). We
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Shown are normal quantile plots for the mean foraging benefits obtained by individual baboons belonging to the large and small group when at (A) natural
and (B) experimental patches for comparable time periods, under two contest-competition treatments. Normal quantile plots are used to indicate skew from
normality: where the distribution is normal, the points fall along a straight line. In addition, a binomial ‘‘B’’ skew index [28] is given, in which zero indicates
a random distribution and higher values indicate increasing skew. The mean daily consensus cost or gain6 SE for decisions to visit experimental patches
over natural patches (i.e., foraging benefits in experimental patch minus foraging benefits in natural patch) is also shown, in panel (C).found that not only did individuals in the larger group spend
less time grooming (Mann-Whitney tests: W = 2226049, nlarge =
1644, nsmall = 1096, p = 0.05), but a smaller proportion of indi-
viduals interacted socially with the leader (0.50 versus 0.33 of
adult females in the small and large groups, respectively).
Both results support the interpretation that strong social rela-
tionships between leaders and followers are necessary for
the emergence of despotic group decisions. We also consid-
ered the possibility that fission was driven by higher consensus
costs, but these results did not differ between groups (Mann-
Whitney tests: ‘‘high’’ treatment, nlarge = 16, nsmall = 11, W =
266, p = 0.83; ‘‘low’’ treatment, nlarge = 16, nsmall = 17, W =
248, p = 0.73) (Figure 4). Our findings are consistent with a wider
pattern of time-budget stress in large groups that links reduced
social time with a higher probability of fission [36].
Nonvisits are likely to reflect a different process. Specifi-
cally, in light of the preceding results, we anticipated that non-
visits might be associated with a switch in leader incentives.
Consistent with our expectation, the dominant male was
mate-guarding an oestrous female on the majority of nonvisit-
ing days by the small group (9/12 cases; Figure S3), whereas
he was never mate-guarding on the days that the group visited
the patch (Fisher’s exact test: p < 0.001). No mate-guarding
was recorded in the large group, and non-visits were corre-
spondingly rare (n = 2/40). During mate-guarding (consortship)
in baboons, males follow females closely, so it is the femalewho guides and constrains her male partner’s behavior [37].
Because this particular oestrous female was only midranking
(4/10 within females, and 8/14 overall) and experienced a net
consensus cost from patch visits, there was no incentive for
her to lead the dominant male to the patch.
Conclusions
Our field experiments on wild baboons indicate that despotic
group decisions can emerge when an individual has both
a strong incentive to lead and sufficient social influence to
elicit follower behavior. Follower behavior occurred despite
consensus costs, but where social ties were weaker, group
fission was more likely. The influential role of the leader was
further highlighted by the observation that groups failed to visit
the food patch when the leader’s priorities changed. Our find-
ings emphasize the importance of leader incentives and social
relationships in group decision-making processes and the
emergence of despotism.
Experimental Procedures
Study Site and Subjects
We conducted our study at Tsaobis Leopard Park, a wildlife reserve in the
Karibib District of Namibia, Southern Africa (15 450E, 22 230S), with two
groups of wild chacma baboons, Papio ursinus (nlarge = 60; nsmall = 32),
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ually recognizable. Our study focuses on adults only (nlarge = 22: 4 males,
18 females; nsmall = 14: 4 males, 10 females).
Foraging Experiments
Each group was offered an experimental food patch placed at a single loca-
tion within in its core home range (Figure S5). Patches were provided in two
treatments: high-contest competition (20 days) and low-contest competi-
tion (20 days), both of which were of a size and shape that allowed access
by only a minority (<50%) of baboons (although the high-contest patch
excluded more individuals). The patch design was based on prior observa-
tion of the baboons’ abilities to monopolize naturally occurring high-quality
food patches. High-contest patches were 315 m2 and 160 m2 for large and
small groups, respectively, equivalent to an available area of approximately
12.5 m2 per adult baboon. Low-contest patches were increased by a factor
of two, to 630 m2 and 320 m2, equivalent to approximately 25 m2 per
baboon. For each patch condition, the amount of food—dry maize
kernels—presented remained constant per individual within groups, so
that the large group received more than the small group, at approximately
80 g of maize per adult baboon in each case (each kernel was 0.39 6
0.01 g). Low-contest patches followed high-contest patches, with an inter-
vening period of at least 10 days during which no experiments were
conducted. Consecutive experimental days started once the group had
encountered the patch by chance. One experiment was run for each group,
the first with the large group (6/15/06 to 8/5/06) and the second with the
small group (8/24/06 to 10/15/06), during the same dry season [38] (see
Figure S3).
Two observers followed the baboon groups on foot for full days through-
out the study period, recording the group’s daily route taken and any
approach to the experimental food patches (taking group coordinates using
handheld Garmin Etrex GPS units at 30 min intervals). Upon approach and
entry into the patch, these observers recorded individual arrival order,
bite rates, and time spent in patch for all baboons (see below). To identify
any fission events and to corroborate arrival orders, a third observer was
positioned at the food patches before sunrise each day.
Measuring Foraging Benefits
Foraging benefits for individuals during group visits to experimental food
patches, defined as the number of kernels ingested per visit, were calcu-
lated from the time an individual spent in the experimental patch (rather
than outside the patch) and his or her mean bite rate during this time (one
kernel is consumed per bite). These data were obtained from patch scans
and bite-rate observations, respectively. The patch scans recorded the
number and identity of all individuals on the experimental patch at 5 min
intervals. The bite-rate observations were 1 min focal watches, in which
all hand-to-mouth consumptions of corn kernels were recorded, collected
sequentially for all individuals in the patch. In total, 957 scans were com-
pleted: nlarge = 553 (272, 281: scans for high-contest and low-contest
patches, respectively) and nsmall = 404 (138, 267). Similarly, nlarge = 1036
bite-rate observations (601, 435 for high-contest and low-contest patches,
respectively) and nsmall = 331 (128, 203) were collected. Individually, each
baboon appeared in 64 6 1 scans and was sampled for 34 6 1 bite-rate
observations.
To measure the corresponding foraging benefits in natural food patches,
one-hour focal watches on foraging adults were conducted during full-day
follows. To control for any variation in foraging due to time of day, all individ-
uals were sampled equally across both morning and afternoon observation
periods. Focals were only begun once groups had been foraging for more
than 20 min, to exclude periods of inactivity when resting, at waterholes,
or at sleeping sites. During focals, all time spent feeding in patches (rather
than traveling between patches) was recorded by continuous monitoring.
Bite-rate observations were also made on individuals opportunistically
during focal watches when visibility permitted. This allowed us to calculate
the average food bites consumed per unit of time spent feeding in natural
patches for each individual. This, in turn, allowed us to compare the number
of bites obtained during feeding in the experimental patch versus the
number of bites obtained over a comparable time period during feeding in
natural patches: the consensus cost or gain. The natural foraging benefits
corresponding to the high- and low-contest experimental patches were
derived from a 20 day period preceding or following these patches, respec-
tively (Figure S3). A mean 6 SE of 15 6 2 hr was recorded per individual,
during which 25.5 6 1.5 bite-rate observations were recorded. During
these observations of natural foraging, the groups were never observed to
fission.Measures of Dominance, Social Affiliation, and Genetic Relationships
Dominance relationships were established on the basis of approach-avoid
interactions (active supplants and displacements) between individuals.
Dominance ranks were stable, so data were drawn from across the entire
field season (May–December 2006) to provide a larger sample. These data
were collected ad libitum (nlarge = 1485, nsmall = 1698 interactions), and their
frequencies were recorded in actor-recipient matrices. Dominance hierar-
chies were then determined with Landau’s linearity index (h) implemented
in Matman [39], and linear hierarchies were found in both groups (hlarge =
0.65, p < 0.001; hsmall = 0.93, p < 0.001). All males outranked all females.
Individual dominance ranks were then scaled by group size and assigned
a value between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating the highest rank (i.e., dominant
male) and 0 the lowest (i.e., most subordinate female).
Grooming is a standard measure of social affiliation in primates e.g., [40].
We used a matrix of grooming interactions collected ad libitum (nlarge =
2,535, nsmall = 1,727 interactions) over the course of the field season to
calculate an index representing the strength of social affiliation between
pairs of individuals (dyads). Because we were concerned with how evenly
social contacts were distributed across dyads, our actor-recipient matrix
was folded across the main diagonal and corresponding cells were summed
to yield a triangular matrix. We then calculated the frequency of grooming
for dyad ij divided by the mean frequency of grooming for all dyads in the
group. High values of the index represent dyads that had stronger bonds
than expected, and low values represent those with weaker bonds.
Variation in grooming time was calculated from scan data at 30 min inter-
vals over the entire field season, excluding experimental periods (nlarge =
1645 scans over 78 days, nsmall = 1097 over 54 days). Scans began 30 min
after the baboons left the sleeping site and ended at dusk at the sleeping
site. Data on the proportion of baboons that were in view and engaged in
five broad categories of activity were recorded: (1) traveling, (2) resting, (3)
feeding, (4) grooming, and (5) drinking. Traveling was defined as brisk
locomotion; feeding was defined as travel foraging (slow locomotion while
searching for, manipulating, and ingesting food) and stationary foraging
(searching for, manipulating, and ingesting food while remaining in one
location); resting described the baboons’ sedentary state in which they
were not traveling or foraging and included sleeping; grooming involved
affiliative allogrooming; and drinking referred to drinking from a waterhole.
Genetic relatedness between group members was derived from DNA
analysis. We obtained DNA for adults in both groups from tissue (n = 35)
and fecal (n = 1) samples as part of a wider investigation into relatedness
in the Tsaobis baboon population (Cowlishaw et al., unpublished data).
Individuals were genotyped at 17 microsatellite loci. See Table S1 for
more details on the analysis of these data.
Statistical Analysis
Simple bivariate relationships were tested with standard two-tailed para-
metric tests (or nonparametric tests when the data could not be normal-
ized). Arrival orders were analyzed with generalized linear mixed models
(GLMMs). We conducted one model for each group and explored the effects
of individual dominance rank, as well as social affiliation and genetic relat-
edness to the individual who arrived first. We also tested for the overall
effects of treatment (high-contest patch, low-contest patch) and sex
(male, female) on arrival order. All two-way interactions were tested, but
none were found to be significant. We incorporated ‘‘day’’ and ‘‘individual
ID’’ as random effects in our models, in order to control for nonindepen-
dence of repeated observations of individuals over experimental days.
Backward elimination was used in selecting the minimal adequate model
and included only those factors that contributed significantly (p < 0.05) to
the explanatory power. The significance of fixed terms is presented as
Wald statistics evaluated against the Chi-square distribution. Full model
results are presented in Table S1.
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Data include five figures and one table and can be found
with this paper online at http://www.current-biology.com/supplemental/
S0960-9822(08)01417-6.
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